gulf of tonkin conspiracy gulf of tonkin conspiracy

The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. In a conversation with McNamara on Aug. 3, after the first incident, Johnson indicated he hadalready thought about the political ramifications of a military response and hadconsulted with several allies. He is the author of Shadow War: The Secret War in Laos, as well as several short studies on special operations, including The War in Cambodia (Osprey Books, 1988), The War in Laos (Osprey Books, 1989), and Southeast Asian Special Forces (Osprey Books, 1990). Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, agreed and suggested that a U.S. Navy ship could be used to vector 34A boats to their targets.6. Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. The Maddox planned to sail to 16 points along the North Vietnam coast, ranging from the DMZ north to the Chinese border. Related:LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. The House passed the resolution unanimously.17 In fact, the North Vietnamese were trying to avoid contact with U.S. forces on August 4, and they saw the departure of the Desoto patrol ships as a sign that they could proceed to recover their torpedo boats and tow them back to base. The United States denied involvement. Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. The Health Conspiracy. In 1996 Edward Moises book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly released concrete evidence that the SIGINT reporting confirmed the August 2 attack, but not the alleged second attack of August 4. What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. This mission coincided with several 34A attacks, including an Aug. 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands. . https://www.historynet.com/case-closed-the-gulf-of-tonkin-incident/, Jerrie Mock: Record-Breaking American Female Pilot, When 21 Sikh Soldiers Fought the Odds Against 10,000 Pashtun Warriors, Few Red Tails Remain: Tuskegee Airman Dies at 96. Hickman, Kennedy. One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. LBJ's War is a new, limited-edition podcast that unearths previously unheard audio that helps us better understand the course of the Vietnam War and how Lyndon Johnson found himself where he did. Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. . Within the year, U.S. bombers would strike North Vietnam, and U.S. ground units would land on South Vietnamese soil. All missed, probably because the North Vietnamese had fired too soon. On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto patrol off North Vietnam. Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. It was 1964, an election year, and the Republicans had just nominated Barry Goldwater, a former jet fighter pilot, and hardcore hawk, to run against Johnson in November. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. With that report, after nearly four decades, the NSA officially reversed its verdict on the events of August 4, 1964, that had led that night to President Lyndon Johnsons televised message to the nation: The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. During a meeting at the White House on the evening of 4 August, President Johnson asked McCone, "Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin? IV-2 to IV-4. Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. Operations Security (OPSEC) concerns and related communications restrictions prevented Maddox and its operational commanders up to the Seventh Fleet from knowing of the commando raid. Launching on Aug. 5, Operation Pierce Arrow saw aircraft from USS Ticonderoga and USS Constellation strike oil facilities at Vinh and attack approximately 30 North Vietnamese vessels. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. 8. These types of patrols had previously been conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. 15. "5, In reality there was little actual coordination between 34A and Desoto. Badly damaged, the boat limped home. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy of the U.S. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. PTF-1 and PTF-5 raced toward shore. The historian here is obliged to deal with two basic considerations in offering up an accounting: the event itself -- that is, what actually happened there in the waters off North Vietnam in early August 1964; and the uses made of it by President Lyndon Johnson and his administration. These PTFs were manned by South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. Nigerians await election results in competitive race. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 Listen to McNamara's conversation with Johnson. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in Moments later, one of the crewmen spotted a North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boat bearing down on them. 14. no isolated event. PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. The two boats headed northeast along the same route they had come, then turned south for the run back to South Vietnam. U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. The battle was over in 22 minutes. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . However, unlike the good old days when -- as the wizened cynical Frenchmen put it, history was a lie agreed-on -- no longer can governments after the battle simply set down how it went and that is that. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. At Hon Nieu, the attack was a complete surprise. Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. The crews quietly made last-minute plans, then split up. He readthe chiefs a cable from the captain of the Maddox. In response, the North Vietnamese boat launched a torpedo. Historians still argue about what exactly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. Top Essentials to Know About the Vietnam War, Timeline of the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War), Vietnam War: General William Westmoreland, M.S., Information and Library Science, Drexel University, B.A., History and Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. At each point, the ship would stop and circle, picking up electronic signals before moving on. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. McNamara was ready to respond. 302-303. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. At about the same time, there were other "secret" missions going on. In turn, that means Signals Intelligence is a valuable source but it is not perfect. "13 As far as the State Department was concerned, there was no need to "review" the operations. Both U.S. ships opened fire on the radar contacts, but reported problems maintaining a lock on the tracking and fire control solution. As a result, the ships offshore were able to collect valuable information on North Vietnamese military capabilities. Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. The United States Military had three SIGINT stations in the Philippines, one for each of the services, but their combined coverage was less than half of all potential North Vietnamese communications. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American soldier casualties. Two nearly identical episodes six weeks apart; two nearly opposite responses. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. Fluoride. It authorized the president to "prevent further aggression . Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. Around midday on Aug. 4, Adm. Grant Sharp, the top navy commander in the Pacific, made a call to the Joint Chiefs, and it was clear there were significant doubts about this second incident. Early Military Career There was more or less general acceptance of the Navy's initial account -- there was an unprovoked attack on Aug. 2 by three North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American warship, the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. It reveals what commanders actually knew, what SIGINT analysts believed and the challenges the SIGINT community and its personnel faced in trying to understand and anticipate the aggressive actions of an imaginative, deeply committed and elusive enemy. One of the great ironies of the Gulf of Tonkin incident for President Johnson is that it was for him, politically, a great success, he continues. But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States.