State v. Langlands, 276 Ga. 721, 583 S.E.2d 18 (2003). - Evidence that the defendant was found in possession of two black powder guns was sufficient to support the convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and by a convicted felon. A drug dealer told police that the drug dealer saw the defendant shoot the victim, although the drug dealer said at trial that the drug dealer did not see the shooting; the drug dealer's spouse testified as to a statement by the drug dealer that was inconsistent with the drug dealer's trial testimony; and another prosecution witness testified that before the shooting, the defendant said that the defendant was "going to get" the victim and that afterward, the defendant said, "I told you I was going to do" the victim. 350, 651 S.E.2d 489 (2007). 17-10-7. 16-11-131 was tantamount to a directed verdict, requiring reversal. Evidence supported the defendants' convictions of malice murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google, There is a newer version of the Georgia Code, CHAPTER 11 - OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, ARTICLE 4 - DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES AND PRACTICES, PART 3 - CARRYING AND POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. When the state's evidence showed that the defendant pulled into a parking lot while the victim was robbing a friend of the defendant's, waited in the defendant's car until the victim came around a corner, and then shot the victim three times without the victim ever having aimed the victim's gun at the defendant, there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of felony murder based on the defendant's killing the victim while being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of O.C.G.A. 2d 213 (1984). 313, 744 S.E.2d 833 (2013). Former Code 1933, 26-2914 (see now O.C.G.A. 828, 711 S.E.2d 387 (2011). Rev. - Defendant's counsel's performance was defective for failing to file a motion to suppress a handgun found by police in the defendant's rear waistband because the defendant was in handcuffs, face down on the floor, and could have reasonably believed that the defendant was under arrest. 230, 648 S.E.2d 738 (2007). Thomas v. State, 305 Ga. App. The offenses charged were separate and distinct and there was no merger; evidence used to establish the burglary was not again used to establish the later crime of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. 310, 520 S.E.2d 466 (1999). Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. - Firearms found in the defendant's girlfriend's room, occupied by the defendant and defendant's girlfriend at the time of arrest, were properly admitted as being relevant to prove the necessary elements of O.C.G.A. 248, 651 S.E.2d 174 (2007). 775, 296 S.E.2d 110 (1982); Brooks v. State, 250 Ga. 739, 300 S.E.2d 810 (1983); Alexander v. State, 166 Ga. App. Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon convictions since the jury was entitled to give greater weight to the victim's positive contemporaneous identification of the defendant as the shooter and to conclude that the victim's subsequent uncertainty resulted from fear of retaliation by the defendant rather than from any real confusion about who fired the shot; the jury was also entitled to give little weight to a negative gunshot residue test result on defendant's hands as a sergeant regularly ordered gunshot residue tests on suspects. Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of the aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because a house-sitter returned to a residence to discover an intruder inside; the intruder flashed a gun and told the house-sitter that the intruder would shoot the house-sitter; the house-sitter identified the defendant, whom the house-sitter had known for over 20 years, as the intruder; and a back window of the home had been shattered. 1203(2). Since defendant possessed the firearm in violation of O.C.G.A. WebNORFOLK, Va. An Isle of Wight man was sentenced today to 81 months in prison for being a convicted felon in possession of firearms and ammunition. 1. 324, 316 S.E.2d 791, rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), overruled in part by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005). No error found in court's charging the language of O.C.G.A. Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, based upon defendant's and an accomplice's robbing a store at gunpoint, was affirmed because the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction as latent fingerprints, which belonged to defendant, that were found in the car used in the armed robbery sufficiently corroborated the testimony of the accomplice who identified defendant as the driver of the car before the accomplice recanted the accomplice's custodial statement at trial. art. Wyche v. State, 291 Ga. App. - In a case in which the evidence showed that defendant, a convicted felon, used a firearm to shoot the deceased, a trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to quash the indictment under O.C.G.A. .040 Possession of firearm by convicted felon -- Exceptions -- Applicability to youthful offenders. Nonforcible felon who has been free of restraint or supervision for five years is not eligible to apply for a license to carry firearms unless the felon obtains a pardon within the meaning of O.C.G.A. However, because the defendant possessed all six of the long guns simultaneously, those six counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon involving the long guns merged for purposes of sentencing. WebSPRINGFIELD, Ill. A federal jury returned a guilty verdict on February 22, 2023, against Aaron Jackson, 30, of Springfield, Ill. for knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. - Because the defendant had completed a three-year first-offender probationary sentence and had been discharged without court adjudication of guilt pursuant to O.C.G.A. 16-11-131 where a victim testified to seeing the weapon emerge from the window of defendant's truck, and then saw the muzzle flash. Clark v. State, 194 Ga. App. 608, 845 S.E.2d 345 (2020); Marshall v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Sept. 8, 2020). Att'y Gen. No. Possession of firearms by convicted felons and first offender probationers (a) As used in this Code section, the term: (1) "Felony" means any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or more and includes conviction by a court-martial denied, 129 S. Ct. 169, 172 L. Ed. - Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Georgia Crime Information Center Council, 140-2-.17. (a) Criminal possession of a weapon by a convicted felon is possession of any weapon by a person who: (1) Has been convicted of a person felony or a violation of article 57 of chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes State v. Mills, 268 Ga. 873, 495 S.E.2d 1 (1998). 24-5-506) to try a firearms possession charge, which required evidence of a prior felony conviction, together with a marijuana and a burglary charge. Construction with 16-3-24.2. Belt v. State, 225 Ga. App. 16-11-131(c) mandating the granting of a pardon. (a) As used in this Code section, the term: (1) "Felony" means any offense Strawder v. State, 207 Ga. App. 3d Art. 896, 418 S.E.2d 155 (1992). Jury was authorized to find that guns found in defendant's automobile were actual working firearms since there was no evidence introduced to refute a police officer's testimony that the guns were pistols. Defendant was not convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under O.C.G.A. WebSec. You can explore additional available newsletters here. Web(b) If a felon is convicted of a criminal offense other than possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and he or she possessed a firearm in commission of that offense, then the felon shall be penalized for violating this section one (1) class more severely if it is a second or subsequent violation of this section. 493, 349 S.E.2d 490 (1986); Booker v. State, 257 Ga. 37, 354 S.E.2d 425 (1987); Jackson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 711, 350 S.E.2d 53 (1986). Although the trial court might not have been presented with evidence that the defendant was in physical possession of a firearm during the hijacking of the victim's car, because the evidence that was presented authorized a finding that the defendant was a party to that crime, and that all those involved were joint conspirators, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant a new trial on grounds that the indictment charging possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony was at fatal variance with the proof presented at trial. 80-122. 918, 368 S.E.2d 771 (1988); Spivey v. State, 193 Ga. App. McTaggart v. State, 285 Ga. App. 580, 305 S.E.2d 29 (1983); Brown v. State, 168 Ga. App. SPRINGFIELD, Ill. A federal jury returned a guilty verdict on February 22, 2023, against Aaron Jackson, 30, of Springfield, Ill. for knowingly possessing a firearm as a Martin v. State, 281 Ga. 778, 642 S.E.2d 837 (2007). 2d 50 (2007). The District Attorneys Office .050 Possession of Admission of a certified copy of defendant's five-year sentence for a prior conviction of armed robbery showing both that defendant had pled guilty to armed robbery and that defendant had been represented by counsel satisfied the requirement of O.C.G.A. - Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was reversed because the defendant established ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to object to the witness's testimony that improperly bolstered the investigator's testimony and credibility. 273, 297 S.E.2d 47 (1982). 16-11-131 merged with the defendant's conviction of felony murder under O.C.G.A. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. .020 Carrying concealed deadly weapon. 16-11-131 any offense with a maximum sentence exceeding 12 months, even those denominated "misdemeanor" by the rendering jurisdiction; section was held partly unconstitutional in that it failed to give sufficient notice as to what out-of-state convictions could be used in support of the charge. Fed. Up to $10,000 in fines. Conducting a trial on a possession of a firearm charge prior to the sentencing phase and before the same jury that imposed a death sentence on a defendant did not unnecessarily prejudice the jury by impermissibly placing the defendant's character in issue in the sentencing phase since the state could have introduced evidence of the defendant's prior convictions during the sentencing phase. Fed. 16-11-131(b). Unlawful use or possession of weapons by felons or persons in the custody of the Department of Corrections facilities. 813, 485 S.E.2d 39 (1997). Section 925" was substituted for "18 U.S.C. R. Civ. Roper v. State, 281 Ga. 878, 644 S.E.2d 120 (2007). 16-11-131(b). Evidence that the defendant, who threatened to kill the victim in the past, took the victim to a retention pond, shot the victim, wrapped the body with a large boulder, placed the victim in a retention pond, and, for days, misled the victim's mother and authorities about the victim's whereabouts was sufficient to support convictions for malice murder, felony murder, feticide, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm. Possession of Firearm During Commission of or Attempt to Commit Certain Crimes. 1983, Art. Williams v. State, 238 Ga. App. 324(a), 44 A.L.R. 479, 448 S.E.2d 223 (1994); Boone v. State, 229 Ga. App. 588, 600 S.E.2d 675 (2004). - In a case where the defendant shot and killed the victim during a robbery, trial counsel's performance was not deficient simply because counsel did not move to sever the firearm possession charge from the other counts of the indictment, since that charge was material to the more serious charges, including malice murder, and, thus, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to bifurcate the trial. - Because defendant's three prior felony convictions, and a subsequent conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as a result of one or more of those felonies, remained separate felonies that could be used to impose a recidivist punishment for the commission of yet another felony, and defendant did not seek to collaterally attack any of those convictions, the recidivists sentences imposed under O.C.G.A. 572, 754 S.E.2d 151 (2014). 783, 653 S.E.2d 107 (2007). 16-11-131, because in determining whether a sentence is a felony, the established consideration is what sentence can be imposed under the law, not what was imposed. Evidence supported the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Get free summaries of new opinions delivered to your inbox! I, Para. 16-11-131. 481, 657 S.E.2d 533 (2008), cert. 374, 626 S.E.2d 579 (2006). denied, 192 Ga. App. For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. - It was proper under O.C.G.A. 2d 344 (2008), overruled on other grounds, No. Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence a police officer recovered from a rental car because the officer had reasonable grounds for detaining the defendant since the officer found the defendant and a friend in the parking lot of a closed business late at night, knew that several burglaries and thefts had occurred in the area recently, and observed that the defendant and the friend appeared to be nervous when the officer spoke with them; in the course of securing a firearm the officer saw a firearm in the center console of the rental car, the officer saw in plain view a digital scale with white residue, affording the officer probable cause to effect a custodial arrest of the defendant. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (2006). - O.C.G.A. - It could not be presumed that defendant, as owner and head of a household, owned or possessed the firearms found therein during a search for drugs, where there was no other evidence to show that defendant owned or possessed the firearms; the evidence was not sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Certified copies of a defendant's out-of-state judgment of conviction, associated complaint, and plea hearing transcript were properly admitted into evidence to show that the defendant was a convicted felon for purposes of O.C.G.A. 492, 379 S.E.2d 199, cert. 16-11-131(b) was found ambiguous and permitted only one prosecution and conviction for the simultaneous possession of multiple firearms. After the appellant was found guilty of criminal damage to property, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, evidence of the appellant's prior felony conviction for voluntary manslaughter was clearly admissible since the state's evidence proving the appellant's prior conviction contained references not only to voluntary manslaughter, as alleged in the indictment, but also to charges of murder and aggravated assault. State Journal-Register. 770, 728 S.E.2d 286 (2012). Count of possession of firearm by convicted felon does not merge with related armed robbery charge. 16-11-131 provides sufficient notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that a conviction by an out-of-state court of a crime, which authorized punishment of up to three years in prison, is a felony conviction for purposes of the statute. 233, 303 S.E.2d 773 (1983); Mayweather v. State, 254 Ga. 660, 333 S.E.2d 597 (1985); Hamilton v. State, 179 Ga. App. One crime is not "included" in the other and they do not merge. Jolly v. State, 183 Ga. App. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S. Ct. 975, 79 L. Ed. Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007), cert. Mantooth v. State, 335 Ga. App. 16-11-131. 16-5-21(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. 130, 392 S.E.2d 896 (1990). Fed. Convictions of felony murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were supported by sufficient evidence showing that, during an argument involving the defendant and the two victims, the defendant told one of the victims to go get the victim's guns, adding that the defendant had guns, the victim went to the victim's vehicle and retrieved two handguns, approached with arms crossed and a gun in each hand, and the defendant took a gun out of the waistband of the defendant's pants and started shooting, wounding one victim and killing the other victim. The evidence authorized the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant used one firearm to shoot the victim and possessed another firearm in the defendant's bedroom. Waiver or Loss of Protection of Federal Attorney 'Work Product' Protection for Expert Witnesses Under Fed. 434, 346 S.E.2d 881 (1986); Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. denied, No. Stephens v. State, 279 Ga. 43, 609 S.E.2d 344 (2005). 88; Gray v. State, 254 Ga. App. 323, 504 S.E.2d 19 (1998); Adams v. State, 239 Ga. App. - Police search of a defendant's bag and person, which produced handguns, cocaine, cash, and other drugs was lawful because the search was made pursuant to the police officers' lawful warrantless arrest of the defendant when the defendant arrived at a motel room exactly answering a detailed description provided by a confidential informant, who stated that the defendant would be carrying a shoulder bag containing drugs and a loaded handgun. What constitutes actual or constructive possession of unregistered or otherwise prohibited firearm in violation of 26 USCS 5861, 133 A.L.R. In the Interest of D. B., 341 Ga. App. 127, 386 S.E.2d 868 (1989), cert. 604, 327 S.E.2d 566 (1985). A record that the relief has been granted by the board shall be entered upon the criminal history of the person maintained by the Georgia Crime Information Center and the board shall maintain a list of the names of such persons which shall be open for public inspection. 16-1-7 and former24-9-20 (see now O.C.G.A. When the record shows two prior convictions and the records of the two convictions are so inextricably intertwined that one could not effectively be masked or otherwise removed from the jury's view, both convictions should be listed by the prosecutor. Fed. Since the defendant's first-offender probation expired prior to the date on which the defendant was alleged to have possessed a firearm and the state presented no evidence that the defendant possessed a firearm during the term of probation and prior to the defendant's discharge, the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer had to be reversed. Any error in the admission of a witness's statements under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt for assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, including the exact match of defendant's blood sample to the blood found at the scene, the location and timing of defendant's capture, and the fact that defendant had a recent gunshot wound. - In a prosecution for violation of O.C.G.A. WebPossession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Crime is a very serious felony in Georgia. O.C.G.A. 16-11-131; although the defendant claimed that the defendant acted in self-defense, the jury was free to reject the defendant's claim. That misdemeanor has been replaced with a new misdemeanor of carrying a weapon without being a lawful weapons carrier (and the same felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted Fed. Chapter 790. - Possession of an antique shotgun while a convicted felon was sufficient to sustain a conviction under O.C.G.A. - Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because the defendant's name did not appear on the lease for the apartment and there was no evidence that the defendant had any clothing or personal items at the apartment; the only evidence linking the defendant to the gun, other than the defendant's proximity to it, was the discovery of paperwork bearing the defendant's name in a closet of the apartment; and that circumstantial evidence did not provide a link between the defendant and the gun, nor did it exclude the possibility that the gun belonged to others present in the apartment - such as the other individual detained in the bedroom or those individuals found in the living room. 16-11-129(b)(3). Malone v. State, 337 Ga. App. In Texas, it is illegal for any person convicted of a felony to possess a gun or ammunition. 16-11-106(b)(1), carrying a concealed weapon, O.C.G.A. 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. Fed. Up to fifteen (15) years of probation. 16-11-131. - State Board of Pardons and Paroles has authority to restore, in a pardon to a Georgian convicted of a felony, the right to receive, possess or transport in commerce a firearm, so long as the pardon expressly uses wording which appears in 18 U.S.C. Those convicted of federal crimes face the worst trouble. Get free summaries of new opinions delivered to your inbox! 616, 386 S.E.2d 39, cert. - One charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was prohibited from collaterally attacking a prior felony conviction that served as the predicate offense since O.C.G.A. 5, 670 S.E.2d 824 (2008). U80-32. 324, 316 S.E.2d 791, rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), overruled in part by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005). 63 (2018). - Unit of prosecution under O.C.G.A. Little v. State, 195 Ga. App. 617, 591 S.E.2d 481 (2003). 16-11-131 is not an ex post facto law because it creates a new offense and imposes punishment for that offense only. 16-8-41(a) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under O.C.G.A. 16-8-41, aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. Simpson v. State, 213 Ga. App. S09C0986, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 341 (Ga. 2009). 16-11-129(b)(3). Because conviction of a prior felony is a necessary element of the crime of firearm possession as proscribed by O.C.G.A. 922(g)(1), convicted felons lose gun rights. denied, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. - Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek to redact the portion of a defendant's first offender plea that related to carrying a concealed weapon. 16-3-24.2. Smallwood v. State, 296 Ga. App. "Firearm" includes any handgun, rifle, shotgun, or other weapon which will or can be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or electrical charge. Major v. State, 280 Ga. 746, 632 S.E.2d 661 (2006). Despite the trial court's abuse of discretion in rejecting the defendant's offer to stipulate to a prior conviction for aggravated child molestation, that error was harmless as it was undisputed that the defendant was a convicted felon, admitted to possessing the firearm, and failed to give any justification for possession or offer any evidence of a legal reason to do so. This charge can land you in prison for a long time. (b.1)Any person who is prohibited by this Code section from possessing a firearm because of conviction of a forcible felony or because of being on probation as a first offender or under conditional discharge for a forcible felony and who attempts to purchase or obtain transfer of a firearm shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years; provided, however, that upon a second or subsequent conviction, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than ten years. 24, 601 S.E.2d 405 (2004). VIII). 139 (2016). 16-5-1 and on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. 16-11-131 cannot also be used to punish a defendant as a repeat offender under O.C.G.A. O.C.G.A. - Since the state offered as proof of defendant's previous felony conviction a certified copy of the 1974 burglary conviction of one Henry Levi Glass and defendant presented no evidence contradicting that defendant was the person named in the 1974 documents, it was held that concordance of name alone is some evidence of identity and that in the absence of any denial by defendant and no proof to the contrary, this concordance of name was sufficient to show that defendant and the individual previously convicted were the same person. Please check official sources. O.C.G.A. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006). Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629 (1983), cert. Midura v. State, 183 Ga. App. Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in the middle of subsection (e), inserted "hijacking a" and inserted "in the first degree". Evidence that defendant kept guns in storage in safes immediately after defendant was released from prison on parole after defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and firing a gun at another was sufficient to show that defendant was guilty of possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer. 922(g)(1), the plaintiff lacked standing because even if 922(g)(1) was declared unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff, Georgia law independently barred the plaintiff from possessing a firearm because of the plaintiff's Michigan convictions. Joiner v. State, 163 Ga. App. 16-5-2(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. O.C.G.A. 163, 290 S.E.2d 159 (1982). 309, 827 S.E.2d 733 (2019); Caldwell v. State, 355 Ga. App. 16-11-129(b)(3)). Davis v. State, 280 Ga. 442, 629 S.E.2d 238 (2006). Smallwood v. State, 166 Ga. App. S08C0978, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 508 (Ga. 2008). Adkins v. State, 164 Ga. App. 764, 315 S.E.2d 257 (1984). Peppers v. State, 315 Ga. App. 2d 74 (1992); Holcomb v. State, 231 Ga. App. Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 29, 2017)(Unpublished). Anderson v. State, 285 Ga. 496, 678 S.E.2d 84 (2009). Fain v. State, 259 Ga. 708, 386 S.E.2d 144 (1989). Baker v. State, 214 Ga. App. Section 46.04 of the Texas Penal Code specifically states that a person who has been denied, No. Biggers v. State, 162 Ga. App. Tanner v. State, 259 Ga. App. Possession of firearms by convicted felons and first offender probationers. View Entire Chapter. 16-11-131 punishes a discrete crime and subjects a defendant to neither double jeopardy nor multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Constructive possession is sufficient to prove a violation. Because the evidence showed that the probationer had continuous access to the firearms in the house on the day of a fatal shooting, and that the probationer intended to, and did in fact exercise control over the sons' access to one of the guns in the minutes leading up to the shooting, the trial court properly found that the probationer had constructive possession of the firearm. 16-3-21 and16-11-138, then it could not be said that the defendant was committing a felony when the defendant shot the victim, and the preclusive bar of 16-3-21(b)(2) would not apply. - In a prosecution of defendant for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, introduction of evidence showing defendant had a prior criminal record was necessary to prove the charge. 16-11-131, the trial court properly dismissed the charge. A judgment of conviction for transporting a stolen motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce or for committing or Brown v. State, 268 Ga. App. 172, 523 S.E.2d 31 (1999). 55, 601 S.E.2d 434 (2004). In the defendant's murder trial, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to specially demur to the counts in the defendant's indictment charging possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and felony murder predicated on that crime because neither count specified the felony of which the defendant was previously convicted; although it was required that the state prove a felony, it was not required that the felony be listed in the indictment. Rev. Any person sentenced as a first offender pursuant to Article 3 of Chapter 8 of Title 42 or sentenced pursuant to subsection (a) or (c) of Code Section 16-13-2 and subsequently discharged without court adjudication of guilt as a matter of law pursuant to Code Section 42-8-60 or 16-13-2, as applicable, shall, upon such discharge, be relieved from the disabilities imposed by this Code section. Further, because the evidence showed that the defendant committed the burglary in which certain guns were stolen, it followed that the defendant took possession of the guns during the burglary, thus, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the verdict of guilty on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge with regard to the guns found in the bedroom of defendant's parent. Warren v. State, 289 Ga. App. The plea to carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor, was not an element of the current charge of the possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer under O.C.G.A. 347. It is illegal for any person who has been convicted of a felony to possess a firearm. Johnson v. State, 308 Ga. 141, 839 S.E.2d 521 (2020). 2016 Statute. 481, 657 S.E.2d 533 (2008), cert. WebThe law concerning Unlawful Possession of a Firearm is found in Texas Penal Code Section 46.04: (a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he 813, 485 S.E.2d 39 (1997). Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 501, 299 S.E.2d 707 (1983). 135, 395 S.E.2d 574 (1990). Herndon v. State, 277 Ga. App. 2d 50 (2007). - Victim's testimony at trial sufficiently identified the defendant as the assailant who fired shots at the victim and the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon since the victim knew the defendant from a previous encounter and although it was dark, the victim was able to see the defendant's face during the incident because the area was illuminated by a streetlight. Gun possession may be restricted based on various factors, including: Age/Type of Gun: Federal law prohibits the sale of a handgun to anyone under age 18. Hightower v. State, 278 Ga. 39, 597 S.E.2d 362 (2004). - Testimony by a ballistics expert proving the operability of the firearm is not required for conviction under O.C.G.A.
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